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Abstract 
 
How are nonstate actors within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) held to account? In this article, we introduce the concept of “institutional 
accountability” to complement the wider literature(s) on accountability in climate governance. 
Within institutional frameworks, actors employ rules, norms, and procedures to demand 
justifications from one another. In light of those justifications, actors then use “exit, voice, or 
loyalty” to positively or negatively sanction each other. To depict the dynamics of institutional 
accountability, we analyze the role of nonstate actors in the nine constituency groups of the 
UNFCCC. We outline the constituency structure and the population of observer organizations. 
We then identify examples where nonstate actors employed institutional rules in tandem with 
exit, voice, or loyalty to foster accountability. In making this analysis we draw upon three years 
of on-site participation at UNFCCC meetings, document analysis, and more than 40 semi-
structured interviews with state and nonstate actors. We conclude by discussing the scope and 
conditions under which institutional accountability may occur in other issue areas of global 
governance. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The 2015 Paris Conference of the Parties under the United Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) heralded the arrival of a legally binding treaty to limit global temperature 
rises and deal with the impacts of climate change. Over the course of two weeks, ten thousand 
non-state actors descended on Le Bourget conference center to attend the negotiations alongside 
nearly thirty-five thousand state delegates. This group of non-state actors is formally divided into 
nine constituencies within the UNFCCC system including businesses, NGOs, trade unions, 
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indigenous groups, and several more. Non-state actors attend these negotiations for many 
different reasons, such as influencing states, providing information, representing excluded 
groups, and acting as watchdogs. As non-state actors have become a permanent feature of 
UNFCCC negotiations, questions arise over to whom they are accountable. In this article, we 
focus on one under-researched aspect, namely how non-state actors hold one-another to account 
within the UNFCCC system. 
This article develops and applies a conception of institutional accountability and thereby 
contributes to the already-established literature on the accountability of non-state actors in 
climate governance specifically and global governance more broadly (see respectively: Newell, 
2008; Grant & Keohane 2005). Accountability, as we use the term, has two components: first, 
some set of actors (accountability wielders) is able to demand justification from another 
(accountability holders) in accordance with established standards; and, second, in light of those 
justifications, confer positive or negative sanctions (Keohane, 2003). Generally speaking, three 
forms of accountability are discussed in the literature. First there is an ‘internal’ or ‘delegation’ 
dimension of accountability, whereby actors are accountable to those who empower them. 
Second there is an ‘external’ or ‘participation’ dimension of accountability in which agents are 
accountable to affected societal stakeholders outside their particular institution. Third are 
‘networked’ forms of accountability in which interactions between network members gives rise 
to demands and mechanisms for monitoring and review of procedures.     
To further develop the dynamics of non-state actor accountability, we argue that another 
dimension of accountability is required to understand how non-state actors are held to account 
within global governance institutions, such as the UNFCCC. We call this institutional 
accountability.1 Within institutional frameworks, rules, norms and procedures exist so that non-
state actors can demand justifications horizontally from one another. These same institutional 
frameworks also enable mechanisms for providing positive and negative sanctions.2 Drawing on 
the seminal work by Albert Hirschman (1970), we contend that actors can employ ‘exit, voice, 
and loyalty’ – withdrawing support, criticizing or praising performance, or remaining loyal – to 
                                                          
1 We define institutions as formal clusters of rules, norms, and procedures governing relationships between those 
working within that institutional framework (Young, 2002, p. 5). Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for 
action. Norms are standards of behavior for determining right and wrong. And procedures are prevailing practices 
for making and implementing collective choice. See Krasner (1982).  
2 Accountability is here treated as a means of curtailing the power of other actors, not as an end in itself. See 
Kramarz and Park (this issue).  
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hold other actors to account. We emphasize how exit, voice, and loyalty can work in isolation as 
separate mechanisms to produce accountability, but we also explore the interactions between 
these mechanisms. This is particularly important because loyalty works essentially to modify the 
impact of both exit and voice. The model of institutional accountability we develop is distinct 
from internal and external variants because it rests on neither a principal-agent model or on a 
democratic model of affectedness. Moreover, it is different from network accountability because 
actors share a more formalized institutional space and may or may not have established 
networked patterns of interaction.  
In order to empirically illustrate the dynamics of institutional accountability, we analyze 
the role of non-state actors in the UNFCCC system. We outline the constituency structure and 
the population of observer organizations. We then identify examples where non-state actors 
employ institutional rules, norms, or procedures in tandem with exit, voice, and loyalty to foster 
accountability within the UNFCCC negotiations. We hone in on the effects of these sanctions to 
highlight the importance of institutional accountability, and to focus on how accountability 
battles between non-state actors play out as part of broader power relations in the UNFCCC.3  
Methodologically, this article offers an illustrative case study that elucidates how 
institutional accountability is employed within and between non-state actors in the UNFCCC. 
We argue that the UNFCCC is an interesting case to study because of its central importance in 
climate governance as well as its high degree of access, inclusion, and participation of non-state 
actors.4 We do not provide a comprehensive inventory of all interactions between non-state 
actors within the UNFCCC, but rather seek to highlight how institutional rules, norms, and 
procedures combine with exit, voice, and loyalty to create the specific mode of institutional 
accountability that we advance. In doing so we draw upon a raft of primary sources including 
UNFCCC documents, data from event observations, position papers from different constituency 
groups, and the websites of various NGOs to understand their governance structures and 
procedures. We also conducted more than 40 semi-structured interviews during the Bonn 
Intersessional in 2013, COP19 in Warsaw during 2013, COP20 in Lima during 2014, and the 
                                                          
3 As such, the ways in which states may engage in ‘institutional accountability’ is bracketed from our analysis. 
4 These dual reasons of centrality and inclusivity provide reasons to think that the results of the case study may be 
generalizable to other institutions in different issue areas which also have high rates of access. 
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Bonn Intersessional in 2015. The interviews cover non-state actors from each constituency group 
as well as officials from the UNFCCC Secretariat.5 
 The article moves forward in four stages. First, we discuss previous literature on the 
accountability of non-state actors in climate change governance and global governance. This 
helps differentiate and define the concept of institutional accountability. Second, we specify the 
role of non-state actors within the UNFCCC institutional system. Third, we investigate how 
institutional accountability arises within the UNFCCC. This entails looking at how rules, 
procedures, and norms are used to demand justification and, subsequently, how exit, voice, and 
loyalty are used to generate sanctions. This article is, to our knowledge, the first to link 
Hirschman’s framework of exit, voice, and loyalty to wider analyses of accountability and 
empirically apply it to climate governance. Finally, we conclude by noting that institutional 
accountability is a crucial part of climate and global governance. We suggest that future research 
should seek to identify if, how, and under what conditions institutional accountability exists in 
other issue-areas of world politics (Kramarz and Park, this issue).6   
  
 
Accountability and Non-State Actors  
 
Literature Overview 
 
At national, regional, and transnational levels of governance, questions about the importance of 
accountability have proliferated in recent decades (Keohane 2003; Gates and Hill, 1995). In this 
article we focus on accountability beyond the state (Grant & Keohane, 2005), specifically within 
the broader landscape of climate governance (Friedman et al., 2005; Bäckstrand, 2008; Betsill et 
al., 2015). From Copenhagen to Paris, the focus has primarily been on accountability of states for 
their (lack of) compliance with emission targets. There has been attention on why states delegate 
responsibility to different international organizations (IOs), and how accountability is maintained 
                                                          
5 See Appendix A. Interviewees are listed alphabetically. Full interview details, including interview protocol, are on 
file with authors. 
6 Our view of institutional accountability reflects clearly the ‘means vs. ends’ distinction of accountability used to 
frame this special issue: Norms, rules, and procedures – which often give rise to shared standards between 
accountability holders and wielders – provide the means of accountability; exit, voice, and loyalty as sanctioning 
mechanisms provide the ends of accountability (see also Kramarz and Park 2016).   
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in these delegation chains (Green, 2014). Focusing on how states and international secretariats 
are held to account for achieving low-carbon development pathways as the world strives to reach 
an agreement to limit global warming remains an important topic not least after the adoption of 
the Paris Agreement in 2015. Also important here is the accountability of non-state actors 
(Newell, 2008; Balboa, this issue). 
There are many reasons why the accountability of non-state actors matters. On one hand, 
it is increasingly recognized that these actors influence states through normative pressures 
(Betsill & Corell, 2001, 2008). This can involve inside or outside lobbying, social movement 
tactics, coalition-building, and naming and shaming (Hadden, 2014; Derman, 2014). The 
exercise of influence by non-state actors fuel questions of accountability. On the other hand, non-
state actors are often seen (or even portray themselves) as critical agents who represent the 
public interest in multilateral affairs (Betsill & Corell, 2008; Omelicheva, 2009; Nasiritousi et 
al., 2014; Balboa, this issue). Yet as Scholte (2004, pp. 230-231) concludes, one of the 
challenges for civil society in seeking to promote democratic accountability in global governance 
is their own lack of accountability: “some civil society players in global politics have not even 
met minimal standards of accountability”. Although non-state actors are often constrained by the 
institutional rules of different IOs, international law, powerful states, and their fiscal donors, 
many other forms of accountability also exist that require uncovering and analysis.  
In this vein, the literatures on climate governance and world politics offer three broad 
(though certainly not mutually exclusive) ways to conceive of the accountability of non-state 
actors.7 The first is often called an ‘internal’ or delegation model of accountability. This internal 
view of accountability follows a principal-agent model in which a principal delegates power to 
an agent and establishes rules and procedures to constrain and/or reward said agent. This is the 
model through which IOs are typically established and regulated, but also applies to non-state 
actors that are provided authority and/or funding by donors, states, or IOs (see Rosenberg, this 
issue). Non-state actors – such as industry groups, indigenous movements, NGOs, and so on – 
can thus be granted power by their own members who pay dues or find other ways to provide a 
base of political support. Jessica Green (2014) has analyzed how accountability operates in the 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) under the Kyoto Protocol as private actors are 
                                                          
7 These modes of accountability do not apply only to non-state actors but are often used to look at sub-state and 
national actors.  
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accountable to the CDM Executive Board that delegate differentiated powers and can initiate 
reviews of specific cases of validation.  
A second view of non-state actor accountability focuses on an ‘external’ dimension. In 
this, actors are held accountable to those societal actors they affect (for a detailed typology of 
internal and external accountability, see Grant & Keohane, 2005, p. 31). This external condition 
is normatively laden, derived mainly from democratic theory, as it understands accountability as 
a relationship that should exist between those who wield power and those whose lives are 
affected or constrained by the exercise of power. In the literatures on global democracy, 
affectedness remains the cornerstone of how to link sites of global public power with the relevant 
democratic publics (Macdonald, 2008). Within the climate governance scholarship, Hayley 
Stevenson and John Dryzek (2014) draw upon this external model as a way to hold state and 
non-state actors to account and, subsequently, democratize climate governance (see also: Newell, 
2008, p. 148; Johnson, this issue). 
A third discussion revolves around networked forms of non-state actor accountability 
(Slaughter, 2004; Bäckstrand, 2008; Gerlak, 2015; Bomberg, 2012). In the international relations 
literature, Anne-Marie Slaughter (2004) documents how the rise of public and private networks – 
such as those between securities regulators or central bankers – leads to disaggregated 
sovereignty. While wary of accountability deficits, Slaughter largely sees networked governance 
as creating preconditions for accountability through monitoring, deliberation, and peer review. 
The climate policy literature has also focused on the accountability of networked climate 
governance in private or hybrid forms as well as cities and municipal networks (Newell, 2008; 
Rosenthal et al., 2015). In loose and informal networks, accountability is manifest as agents 
agree to hold each other to similar standards, compete for funding and market space, or just 
generally leverage ‘naming and shaming’ tactics against one another. Bäckstrand (2008), for 
instance, uses these mechanisms to expose the strengths and weaknesses of accountability in 
public-private partnerships (such as the World Summit on Sustainable Development Climate 
Partnerships) or private networks (such as the International Climate Change Partnerships 
(ICCP)). 
 
Institutional Accountability 
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We find all three types of accountability important as they reflect key aspects of accountability in 
global governance.8 Delegation, participation, and networks certainly provide avenues for some 
actors to demand justifications from others and seek recourse/consent for those actions. 
However, we suggest that these three forms of accountability miss an important dimension, that 
non-state actors are – or can be – held to account by those with whom they share an institutional 
space or framework. This model does not follow the principal-agent logic as agents join 
institutions separately without a delegation chain; it does not entail that all affected parties are 
present within an institution; and the institutions can have different networks operating within 
the same framework. For instance, in the case discussed at length in this article, the UNFCCC 
constituency system provides the institutional space in which many different networks operate. 
This institutional space means that accountability demands arise within as well as between 
networks. Accordingly, we advance institutional accountability as a distinct mode of 
accountability that represents a gap in current literature. 
To formalize the concept we argue that institutional accountability contains two key 
components in line with the above definition of accountability. First, institutional frameworks 
provide a shared terrain of rules, norms, and procedures which are employed by agents 
(accountability wielders) to demand justification from other members (accountability holders) of 
the institution.9 Second, within that institutional framework, mechanisms of exit, voice, and 
loyalty enable both positive and negative sanctioning of the accountability holder by the 
accountability wielder (Hirschman, 1970). Sanctioning here refers to the granting or removal of 
support and/or resources. We consider institutional accountability to have occurred when these 
two necessary and sufficient conditions are met: demands for justifications are raised and, in 
light of those justifications and shared standards, exit, voice, or loyalty is employed to create 
positive or negative sanctions.  
It is important to hone in on what standards accountability wielders engage to judge 
justifications from accountability holders. We suggest that these standards are expectations about 
                                                          
8 These three variants of accountability, along with the fourth variant of institutional accountability, are better 
viewed as ideal types. In reality, most governance systems blend types of each. 
9 In some instances rules, procedures, and norms provide mechanisms for sanctioning. In these instances, ‘exit, 
voice, or loyalty’ may not be necessary for accountability to occur (though exit, voice, or loyalty may be used to 
compound the effects of institutional rules, procedures, and norms). However, in instances where institutional rules, 
procedures, and norms do not allow for sanctioning, we argue that exit, voice or loyalty may be especially critical 
for generating accountability.  
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how accountability wielders should act in light of their role in an institutional framework. This 
could include following formal and informal rules, norms, and procedures that bind them, but it 
could also entail normative expectations about their purpose in the institution they inhabit (we 
elucidate both in our empirics). For instance, in the case of the UNFCCC, the utility of working 
groups, the way morning meetings are run, and inter-constituency negotiations provide some of 
the rules, norms, and procedures employed by accountability wielders to demand justifications 
and act as the standards against which to judge accountability holders. At other times, though, 
different normative stances about the role of accountability holders in an institution are used. For 
example, the split between radical and mainstream NGOs described in this article reflects a 
different vision of how climate change should be tackled, what role civil society groups should 
play in negotiations, and what pathways to decarbonization are acceptable. Once justifications 
are demanded through rules, norms, and procedures – and judgments made in light of these 
standards – exit, voice, and loyalty is then used to leverage sanctioning. This framework of 
institutional accountability allows us to focus on how actors – in this case non-state actors – 
engage in power battles to question and sanction one-another.10 These four ideal typical modes 
of accountability are presented here in Table 1. 
 
– Insert Table 1 here – 
 
Because we are introducing a new theoretical framework for understanding accountability, the 
ways that exit, voice, and loyalty can produce positive and negative sanctions are important to 
flesh out. Our account draws substantively upon, though differs in some key respects from, 
Hirschman’s original theory.11 Predominantly, we argue that exit is used as a negative sanction, 
voice can be used for both negative and positive sanctioning, and loyalty is employed as a 
positive sanction that moderates the effects of both exit and voice. Exit is used as a way to 
remove support or resources from another agent. Exit comes in two forms within institutional 
accountability (Dowding et al., 2000). First, there is a type of ‘qualified exit’ in which actors 
leave part of an institution but simply relocate to another part of the institutional framework. The 
                                                          
10 We therefore contend that accountability demands are a subset of power relationships. We thank a reviewer for 
encouraging us to clarify this relationship.  
11 Perhaps most notably, Hirschman’s theory was about firm or organizational responses to lost support to regain 
market share. We here emphasize the how the same mechanisms can produce accountability.  
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second is a form of ‘complete exit’ in which actors leave the entire institution to remove support 
and indicate their displeasure. This follows Hirschman’s logic that exit is used by actors to show 
dissatisfaction and seek to punish an agent for insufficient goods or services provision (or, in this 
case, poor justification). Exit is likely when actors have less loyalty to the accountability holder 
and the successful usage of voice is deemed low (Hirschman, 1970, p. 83). 
Voice can be used as a form of either positive or negative sanctioning by agents to show 
their approval or disapproval of others’ justification. Voice can provide positive sanctions by 
accepting justifications, mobilizing others to support an agent, and providing social capital. 
Alternately, voice can be used to criticize justifications, mobilize others against a justifier, or 
demand more justifications causing the justifier to expend further resources and time. Two types 
of voice are worth differentiating here. The first is a form of ‘vertical voice’ in which approval or 
disapproval is directed toward the justifier. The second is a form of ‘horizontal voice’ in which 
an actor, after receiving a justification, voices either approval or disapproval to other actors 
inside or outside of the institutional framework. Again following Hirschman (1970, p. 76), the 
use of voice is more likely to generate accountability through negative or positive sanctions 
when the accountability holder knows that accountability holders have exit options.  
Finally, loyalty is used to show support for a justification and thus provides a form of 
positive sanctioning. This mechanism intersects with – and helps qualify – the use of exit and 
voice. Accountability wielders who are satisfied that justifications are adequately provided will 
show support and remain loyal. Relatedly, accountability holders can seek to secure loyalty to 
make exit and negative voice less likely.12 Although we recognize that it is methodologically 
difficult to separate loyalty from inaction as both provide de facto support, it is important to 
make a theoretical separation (Barry, 1974). Equally, it is important to separate between ‘loyalty 
to the justifier’ and ‘loyalty to the entire institutional framework’ (i.e. a justification is rejected 
but an actor remains loyal to the institution due to a desire not to upset the institutional 
equilibrium). As such, it is critical to probe how, and to whom, loyalty is being granted in 
practice. We therefore acknowledge the importance of identifying both when loyalty differs from 
inaction and to whom loyalty is being granted (Dowding et al., 2000). We elucidate this in our 
                                                          
12 In a formal sense, loyalty acts as elasticity that means that accountability holders have more ability to avoid 
justifications without facing negative sanctions. We thank a reviewer for bringing this connection to our attention.  
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empirical analysis. Having now summarized the core tenets of institutional accountability, we 
turn toward explicating and analyzing the constituency groups within the UNFCCC. 
 
Non-state Actors in the UNFCCC and Beyond 
 
UNFCCC and the Role of Non-State Actors 
 
The institutional framework analyzed in this article is the UNFCCC, which stands at the 
epicenter of the climate change regime after more than two decades of negotiations on climate 
change mitigation and adaption (Betsill et al., 2015). The 1997 Kyoto Protocol reaffirmed the 
notion that the UNFCCC was the central venue to negotiate GHG emission reductions. 
Moreover, the recent Paris Agreement adopted in December 2015 has consolidated the role of 
UNFCCC as a catalyzer and facilitator of non-state climate action on global climate governance 
(Hale 2016).  
Over the past 15 or so years, though, the centralized nature of global climate governance 
has given way to a more fragmented and polycentric system (Jordan et al. 2015; Pattberg and 
Widerberg, forthcoming). The Copenhagen Accord also paved the way for a decentralized 
system of bottom-up pledges for carbon emission reductions replacing quantified targets and 
timetables in the Kyoto Protocol. The system of voluntary pledge-making by states has been 
formalized in the outcomes in subsequent summits, such as the decisions on intended nationally 
determined contributions in the Lima Call for Climate Action. Although the UNFCCC remains a 
key part of the regime complex for climate change, especially in light of the Paris Agreement, 
previous deadlock in multilateral climate negotiations sparked interest in new modes of public, 
private, and hybrid transnational climate governance (Betsill et al. 2015; Bäckstrand, 2008). This 
led to recognition of the growing number and importance of non-state actors in climate change 
governance.   
Although there has been an explosion of non-state actor activity outside the UNFCCC 
(Fisher and Galli 2015), we remain focused on the role of non-state actors within the UNFCCC. 
In this institutional context, non-state actors are increasingly on numerical parity with 
government delegates, and delegations also progressively include more non-state actors 
(Willetts, 2009; Schroeder et al., 2012). COP21 in Paris gathered almost 40,000 delegates, of 
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which 25 000 were from governmental representatives, and the remaining civil society, UN 
agencies, and media organizations.13 Non-state actors perform diverse functions such as 
organizing side-events, providing expertise and information, lobbying national delegates, 
organizing protests, monitoring of implementation, and so on (Schroeder and Lovell, 2012). As 
this brief survey suggests, non-state actors are a vital part of the UNFCCC. But questions abound 
about whether, how, and to whom these non-state actors are accountable (Newell, 2008).   
 
Non-state Actors within the UNFCCC: Observer Organizations and Constituency Groups 
 
Because of the importance of the institutional framework for accountability, we elaborate on the 
UNFCCC constituency system and its rules, norms, and procedures to facilitate analysis. At 
COP21 in Paris, more than 2000 observer organizations were accredited and admitted. These 
observer groups are clustered into nine constituencies with diverse but recognizable interests. 
This model of institutionalized participation emerged from the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992 where Agenda 21 divided civil society into 
UN major groups. The UNFCCC has subsequently adopted such a system of organizing civil 
society into constituencies to facilitate coordination and interaction with government delegates. 
The first two constituency groups to organize within the UNFCCC system were the Business and 
Industry NGOs (BINGO) and the Environmental NGOs (ENGO). At COP1 in 1995 local 
government and municipal authorities (LGMA) joined the fold, followed by the indigenous 
peoples organizations (IPO) at COP7 in 2001, the research and independent NGOs (RINGO) at 
COP9 in 2003, and the trade union NGOs (TUNGO) before COP14/CMP4 in 2008. Women and 
Gender (WGC) along with Youth NGOs (YOUNGO) became full constituencies in 2007 just 
before COP17. Currently farmers and agricultural NGOs (Farmers) have provisional status as a 
constituency group.14 
 These nine constituency groups contain more than 90% of all NGOs admitted during 
each COP (with Climate Justice Now! (CJN) notably missing). Although there is clearly much 
                                                          
13 https://www.carbonbrief.org/analysis-which-countries-have-sent-the-most-delegates-to-cop21 (accessed 15 
August 2016). 
14 Farmers are awaiting approval as formal constituency following the recent accreditation of the World Farmers 
Organization as an observer organization under the UNFCCC, the organization holding the focal point of the 
constituency. 
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cross-over between the groups, each constituency stands for a particular set of interests and 
ideas. Observer groups are allowed to list themselves with more than one constituency group 
when they become accredited but this is not a prolific choice, indicating that many groups do feel 
aligned with their constituency. While being part of a constituency group is not essential, it is 
certainly beneficial for observer groups. Constituency members receive: access to the Plenary 
floor so as to make interventions; allocation of secondary badges when site access is limited; 
advance information from the Secretariat; access to daily meetings with their constituency group; 
occasional invitations to Ministerial receptions; access to bilateral meetings with officials; and 
invitation by the Secretariat to limited-access workshops between sessional periods. 
 Structurally, each constituency interacts with the Secretariat through a focal point: an 
individual chosen as a representative on behalf of the constituency.15 Six of the groups have one 
focal point (BINGO, ENGO, TUNGO, RINGO, LGMA, and Farmers) and the remaining three 
(Women and Gender, IPO, and YOUNGO) have two focal points. The job of the focal point is 
to: channel information between the Secretariat and the constituency members; assist the 
Secretariat in ensuring effective NGO participation (i.e. UNFCCC rules are followed by observer 
groups); and provide logistical support to their constituencies during session. For instance, the 
focal point coordinates observer interactions at sessions, convenes constituency meetings, 
organizes meeting with officials, provides names for speaker lists, and offers “representation at 
official functions” (Kuyper and Bäckstrand, 2016). This occurs at semi-annual meetings when all 
focal points meet with the Secretariat to convey the interactions between, and interests of, their 
constituency organizations. The focal point also assists “the Secretariat in realizing 
representative observer participation at workshops and other limited-access meetings.”16 
 From this institutional overview, it is clear that many non-state actors operate within the 
UNFCCC institutional framework. Numerous NGOs are admitted as observers, work within 
constituency groups, and interact with the Secretariat through focal points of those 
constituencies. Institutional rules, procedures, and norms provide some ways for non-state actors 
                                                          
15 For a detailed examination of how individual focal points are selected, see (Kuyper and Bäckstrand, 2016). 
16 UNFCCC, Non-Governmental Organization Constituencies. Available at: 
https://unfccc.int/files/parties_and_observers/ngo/application/pdf/constituencies_and_you.pdf (accessed 12 
December 2015). 
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to demand justifications from each other.17 In turn, it is the shared institutional space which 
provides scope for mechanisms of exit, voice, and loyalty to be used, tested, and recalibrated 
over time as non-state actors seek to sanction one-another. Although this occurs across 
constituency groups, most of the empirical examples we excavate are from within intra-
constituency battles.  
 
Institutional Accountability through Exit, Voice, and Loyalty  
 
Before beginning the analysis, a more in-depth discussion of our methodology and data 
collection is warranted. In analyzing the UNFCCC as an illustrative case-study to unpack the 
logic of institutional accountability, we draw upon four years of on-site observation at COPs and 
Intersessionals. While this does not rise to the level of collaborative event ethnography 
(Campbell et al., 2014), we undertook extensive field notes from meetings, collected 
documentation, and undertook more than 40 semi-structured interviews with state and non-state 
actors. To control for observer bias, we had multiple discussions between the authors of this 
paper on how to reconcile our impressions and views taken at the venues. The next three 
subsections discuss how different non-state actor constellations employed rules, norms, and 
procedures in conjunction with exit, voice, or loyalty to generate accountability of other non-
state actors within constituencies. We explicitly focus on the outcomes of exit, voice, and loyalty 
to demonstrate how these mechanisms actually create sanctions (both positive and negative). We 
draw examples from different non-state actors within the UNFCCC without focusing specifically 
on any constituency or moment in time. As such, some constituency groups are not looked at, 
such as RINGO, which does not have a mandate for policy advocacy. We limit ourselves in this 
way because of space constraints, but also to provide a level of generalizability to our argument 
as we are looking at illustrations of institutional accountability in practice, not testing how each 
constituency operates.18 
 
                                                          
17 Because each constituency group represents a set of interests, it is likely that the standards of accountability vary 
between the groups. Accountability wielders, though, also consider that accountability holders should operate 
according to the rules, norms, and procedures of the institutional space they occupy. 
18 We have also not looked explicitly at Farmers or IPO. These constituencies certainly provide interesting examples 
of accountability (especially as they, in their relatively new state, seek to legitimate themselves) are excluded due to 
space restrictions. 
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Exit 
 
Exit represents an important mechanism for generating accountability. The theoretical logic 
underpinning this mechanism is that actors working within an institutional framework can 
demand justifications from one-another through rules, norms, and procedures and – if the 
justification is not deemed adequate – the actor can remove support and resources by exiting the 
relationship. As Mathias Koenig-Archibugi (2005, p. 122) has suggested when discussing how 
transnational corporations (TNCs) are increasingly able to shift operations between different 
countries and jurisdictions, “opportunities for ‘exit’ turn the accountability relationship upside 
down by making governments accountable to TNCs.” We look at both qualified and complete 
variants of exit in this analysis. 
 On qualified exit, non-state actors within the UNFCCC often ask questions of one-
another and, if the justifications are not acceptable, threaten to shift their allegiances to other 
actors under the same institutional framework. Within the UNFCCC this could mean joining an 
alternative faction within a constituency group or joining another constituency group altogether. 
Precisely because there are many networks operating within the same institutional framework, 
we argue that institutional accountability represents a distinct ideal type. A key example of this 
mechanism emerged from our interviews and observations with the YOUNGO constituency. In 
this constituency battles for accountability play out between members and the focal point. 
Members have the opportunity to demand answers from the focal point at daily meetings, which 
is a rule mandated by the Secretariat. However, if focal points do not provide adequate 
responses, there are few formal mechanisms for sanctioning. 
One mechanism available, though, is to make use of qualified exit. We observed this 
when members of the YOUNGO constituency told us that a key strategy for them to hold the 
focal point to account is by creating working groups which can be employed to “bring issues 
within your orbit” (L. Kemp, Interview, 2014). Although working groups already exist within the 
constituency, actors take it upon themselves to bypass the focal point, create new working 
groups, and use this as a way to shift support. Once a working group is established, actors can 
use the platform as a way to mobilize additional support and address the Secretariat directly 
without using the focal point as an intermediary. In further interviews, one of the focal points of 
YOUNGO noted that the creation of alternative working groups hampered their efforts for 
15 
 
streamlining the position of YOUNGO and made their task more demanding (S. Marquant, 
Interview, 2014). This strategic use of qualified exit thus shows how actors can use formal rules 
and procedures (by creating competing working groups within a constituency) to shift support 
away from focal points as a way to sanction them (by removing power and support from their 
mandate). Because actors often do not have a monopoly within the constituency, qualified exit is 
possible as a sanctioning mechanism (Hirschman 1970, p. 26). 
An example of using ‘complete exit’ to generate institutional accountability can also be 
derived from the constituency system of the UNFCCC. In some cases – notably BINGO and 
ENGO – single networks do dominate a constituency (Kuyper and Bäckstrand, 2016). In these 
instances of monopoly, complete exit is the more likely mechanism for sanctioning.19 Perhaps 
the most prominent example of this came in 2007 at the COP in Bali when a new network of 
activists – Climate Justice Now! – was launched. This represented a split from the remainder of 
the ENGO constituency where the mainstream Climate Action Network (CAN) allocated the 
constituency focal point (Hadden, 2015; Reitan & Gibson, 2012). In Bali CJN decided to leave 
ENGO entirely in the hands of CAN and seek to mobilize a radical, outsider critique of the 
climate change negotiations (CJN, 2007). Today around 400 organizations belong to CJN with 
the primary goal of the network being to take action “on the ground and in the streets”.20 
Although some member organizations of CJN remain observers to the UNFCCC, the network 
itself operates externally to ENGO, thus being an example of complete exit.21 This case then 
highlights the difference between ‘networked accountability’ (in which justification demands 
arise between network members) and institutional accountability (in which the wider framework 
provides rules, norms, and procedures for actors in different networks to demand justifications 
from one-another). In this instance the institutional framework allowed some members to not 
only leave the network of CAN (as we would see in networked accountability) but also to 
relocate to another part of the institutional system and continue using this framework to pressure 
actors in other networks. 
                                                          
19 We thank a reviewer for impressing this point upon us. 
20  Climate Justice Now! discussion list. Available at: https://lists.riseup.net/www/info/cjn (accessed 18 October 
2015). 
21 From the 2015 constituency information document released by the UNFCCC Secretariat, CJN is not included as 
constituency in ENGO nor given a focal point. This illustrates the ‘complete exit’ adopted by CJN. See 
https://unfccc.int/files/parties_and_observers/ngo/application/pdf/constituency_focal_point_contact_details.pdf 
(accessed 18 October 2015). 
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A methodological limitation facing analysis of CAN-CJN, however, is that virtually all of 
our interviewees from ENGO were reluctant to speak about the fractions between CAN and CJN. 
For example, one interviewee admitted internal divisions in the past, but claimed that 
relationship between CJN and CAN are healing as they have joint meetings and coordination (T. 
Athanasiou, Interview, 2015). Despite this, there were several reasons underpinning the split of 
CJN from CAN. The root of the exodus was a divide between the first generation of reform-
oriented pragmatic climate movement, embodied in CAN, and the second generation anti-
capitalist, system-critical radical climate justice movement of CJN (Bond, 2012; Hadden, 2015; 
Reitan & Gibson, 2012). Division was spurred on by an ideological factor: years of multilateral 
gridlock and frustration, especially after Copenhagen, with weak outcomes in terms of curbing 
carbon emissions radicalized and diversified the climate movement in terms of both ideology and 
tactics. The fault-line between the reformist, science-based, and hierarchical CAN and the 
radical, anti-systemic, and horizontal CJN widened as issues – such as the role of market-based 
mechanisms in the Kyoto Protocol – rose on the international agenda. Many members of CJN 
felt that CAN had become too diverse and unwieldy. This diversity led to the impression that 
several core positions within the group were irreconcilable, such as CAN’s support of emissions 
trading. As one interviewee stated, “CAN want to do what is politically feasible while CJN want 
to do what is right” (N. Amerasinghe, Interview, 2015). Resultantly, key members of CJN did 
not think CAN spoke sufficiently on behalf of the most vulnerable communities to climate 
change (Reitan & Gibson, 2012, p. 398). 
Secondly, there was a pragmatic reason that caused the split to occur when it did: 
facilities at Bali were not large enough to hold both CJN and CAN members. This logistical 
problem was aggravated at COP15, where the conflict between CAN member and CJN centered 
around the limitation of badges, and the smaller network of CJN received 40% of the badges. 
The institutional constraints to climate activism were further reinforced at COP21 Paris, where 
protest and demonstration was curtailed by the UNFCCC secretariat in the wake of the terror 
attack (Orr 2016). Because of the lack of facilities, the ability for CJN members to demand 
justifications from CAN and other ENGO members became limited. A third reason for the 
complete exit was the antagonism of the UN and interstate system epitomized by CJN slogans 
such as NTAC (Never Trust a COP) at Copenhagen and “No deal is better than a bad deal” 
(Hadden, 2015; T. Anderson, Interview, 2013). The UN system, according to CJN, propagates a 
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false market-based and technological solution from government and corporate elites from above 
(Bond, 2012). 
Exiting ENGO and shifting activities outside of ENGO and (in some cases) the UNFCCC 
was invoked by CJN as a form of accountability. After using UNFCCC rules, norms, and 
procedures to discuss issues and probe justifications from CAN, it became increasingly clear that 
CAN were not able or willing to take on-board more radical policies and distance themselves 
from market-based solutions. The ground for exit was discontent with CAN’s main pragmatic 
strategy that focused on inside lobbying tactics with the aim to influence negotiations: “CAN 
acts as lobbyists in suits instead of being a watchdog environmentalists engaged in outside 
protests” (T Anderson, Interview, 2013). CAN’s strategy stood in sharp contrast to climate 
justice activists’ effort to break the fence and police line at Bella Center at COP15 in 
Copenhagen in order to take over the conference and hold the People’s Assembly for Climate 
Justice (Reitan & Gibson, 2012, p. 402; Fisher & Galli, 2015). In this instance disagreements 
over procedural rules (allocation of badges) and substantive normative commitments (mitigation 
pathways) acted as accountability standards, and members of the CJN decided to cut with CAN 
and exit the broader institutional framework, taking many members and resources with them. 
The complete exit of CJN was thus an attempt to hold CAN accountable for their (lack 
of) action at the COPs. As noted by Jennifer Hadden (2015, p. 50) in her analysis of CJN 
members, one advocate stated that completely exiting the UNFCCC organization was imperative 
to hold big NGOs accountable. The activist argued that CAN “are totally unable to react to the 
most important political issues of the COP…We [CJN] showed them that we really want change; 
we aren’t going to wait behind our stands and hand out stupid leaflets”. While tracing the precise 
effect of CJN exit on CAN policy or behavior is difficult, the fact that CAN members have 
attempted to heal the rift indicates that there have been some efforts made in response to the 
negative sanctioning (Anonymous, Interview, 2014). Resultantly, it is clear that exiting an 
institutional framework – either partially or completely – provides a way to sanction other non-
state actors for their actions and inactions by removing resources and members.  
 
Voice 
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Another mechanism to induce institutional accountability comes through voice. Theoretically 
voice works by using rules, procedures, and norms to demand justifications from other actors 
within the same institutional framework. Once justifications are received, actors can either 
positively or negatively sanction the justifier through continual usage of voice. This can be done 
vertically – by directing praise or criticism toward the justifier – or horizontally – by talking with 
other members of the institutional framework. From within the UNFCCC institutional system, 
we observe that non-state actors use voice to generate both positive and negative sanctions. 
Voice is likely to be used when loyalty is high and the prospects of effective exit as a sanctioning 
device are low (Hirschman 1970, p. 37). 
 We commence with a discussion of voice used to sanction a justifier positively. The 
LGMA constituency seeks to showcase the potential of sub- and non-state action in redressing 
climate change. They do so through dialogue with other actors in the climate regime and not by 
engaging in protests. Local and subnational actors argue that they can enrich and enhance global 
strategies when appropriately included and enabled to do so. As such, the core emphasis is on 
demonstrating the important role that LGMAs can play in implementing international and 
national climate policy. Constituency members seek to increase visibility and obtain 
commitments on the part of national governments to work more closely with their 
subnational/local counterparts. As such there are several common goals that unite members of 
the LGMA constituency and command continual positive usage of voice on the part of its 
member organizations. In the words of an interviewee, “cities have committed to ambitious 
action, they make themselves accountable and visible via registries and huge collaborative 
unities” (S. Nolden, Interview, 2015). Cities and municipalities wish to be included, enabled, and 
mandated to play their role. At the same time, the constituency is encouraging national 
governments to have more local government representatives on their delegations. 
 The LGMA constituency is made up of city representatives and representatives of the 
various global and regional city networks. The most prominent organization within LGMA is 
Local Governments for Sustainability (ICLEI), a city network, which maintains the focal point 
role for LGMA. In light of this role, ICLEI see themselves as bridges or translators between 
cities and the UNFCCC. As the UNFCCC negotiation process is becoming increasingly 
complex, and cities are becoming more competitive with each other, ICLEI and other 
transnational alliances are working toward enabling a two-way dialogue between cities and the 
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UNFCCC, in order to “get the politics and the realities on the ground together” (Y. Arikan, 
Interview, 2013). ICLEI’s goal, in particular, is to create cities that are sustainable, resilient and 
transformative. Many cities are members of networks, associations and agreements, all of which 
are inter-connected as well and cross-fertilize each other – “the city networks together have a 
bigger mandate and bigger outreach” (S. Nolden, Interview, 2015).  
 From interviews and on-site observation, it has become clear that members of the LGMA 
constituency often invoke positive voice to sanction the constituency focal point – Yunus Arikan 
– and ICLEI activities in general.22 In 2014 in Lima, the authors sought to attend morning 
meetings three days in a row. The focal point, against UNFCCC procedures, either cancelled or 
failed to attend said meetings the first two times. On the third occasion the focal point turned up 
almost an hour late and gave a five minute briefing in the hallway outside the meeting room. 
Although members of the constituencies were able to demand justifications, there was discontent 
about the lack of communication from the focal point and other ICLEI members. Subsequent to 
this meeting, in an on-site discussion with an LGMA member, the authors asked about the lack 
of information from the focal point and the general frustration about the cancelled meetings. This 
respondent stated that, although meetings had been delayed or cancelled, it was due to the 
amount of hard work undertaken by Arikan and other ICLEI members. The respondent suggested 
that the positive impact generated in negotiations by ICLEI warranted less responsiveness. As a 
result, this positive voice helps sanction ICLEI and the focal point in their work by quelling 
dissensus amongst other members (horizontal) and providing the organization with social capital 
and resources (vertically) that aid in presenting a coherent position. It is therefore clear that the 
LGMA focal point seeks to secure loyalty in order to increase the likelihood of positive voice. 
 By contrast, an example of negative voice can be drawn from many instances, and we 
focus here upon recent on-site observation at daily meetings at COP21 in Paris. These meetings 
are both functional – involving the dissemination of information from the Secretariat, giving out 
tickets to selected events, discussing housekeeping issues – and sites of political and 
accountability battle. Political battles unfold over, inter alia, strategies for influencing 
negotiations, the wording of Plenary speeches made by the constituency, the type of wording 
                                                          
22 It is also clear from our data and analysis that LGMA strives to build loyalty in order to make voice more likely 
instead of exit (i.e. to generate elasticity when demands for justification rise). Inversely, voice is more powerful as a 
sanctioning mechanism when exit is a viable mechanism. See Hirschman, 1970, p. 76. 
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wanted by different groups within the constituency in negotiation texts, and so on. The morning 
meeting is led, in almost all cases, by the constituency focal point in their role as intermediary 
between the observer organizations within the constituency and the Secretariat. 
 At COP19, 20, and 21, the authors attended daily meetings for many of the constituency 
groups (not all because some – such as BINGO and CAN – are closed to non-constituency 
members). In the second week of COP21, a clear example of negative voice emerged at a 
morning meeting of the TUNGO constituency. The penultimate draft of the Paris Accord had 
been released and there was a discussion about what issues had been included and excluded from 
the finalizing document. The morning meeting was chaired by Anabella Rosemberg who is the 
TUNGO focal point and representative of the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC). 
 As the meeting wore on, a major source of contention emerged between different 
factions. The split concerned the wording of the Paris Agreement draft text and the lack of 
inclusion of the phrase ‘just transition’. TUNGO as a constituency had decided several years 
previously to focus on making sure that any UNFCCC climate agreement remained explicitly 
concerned with the retraining of workforces whose jobs would be displaced under a shift toward 
low carbon technologies (P. Colley, Interview, 2015). In the penultimate draft of the Paris 
Agreement, however, ‘just transitions’ had been included in the decision, but not in the Annex.23 
This was viewed as a substantive loss for the constituency group as it indicated that the phrase 
would not be part of the legally binding section of the Paris Agreement. At the meeting it became 
clear that some constituency members agreed that all had been done to secure the desired 
outcome, whereas other constituency members voiced their concerns that ITUC and other 
influential trade union groups had not lobbied hard enough. 
 This case represented an instance of institutional accountability because observers within 
the TUNGO constituency were able to use the morning meeting to demand justification from the 
focal point and ITUC about their strategy to have just transition included in the text. It 
sanctioned ITUC and the focal point through negative voice as it became clear over the course of 
an hour and twenty minutes that more and more members of the constituency were dissatisfied 
with the omission through horizontal diffusion. One group of members, not from ITUC, started 
to hand out t-shirts from their group in quite a disruptive manner. The meeting ran more than 20 
                                                          
23  In the final draft, ‘just transition’ was included in the Annex, but only in the Preamble, not in an Article. 
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minutes over time and Rosemberg was forced to stay longer, justifying her and ITUC’s position. 
By the end, Rosemberg had made quite a long, impassioned, and perhaps even acerbic speech 
documenting the efforts made by ITUC over the years, stating that no-one in the constituency 
could claim that ITUC and herself had not worked tirelessly, losing sleep, to have ‘just 
transition’ included in the Paris Agreement.24 We consider this expenditure of time and effort 
and effect of the use of negative voice as a sanctioning. The use of morning meetings to demand 
justifications is a procedure to be followed by each constituency. The ongoing usage of voice to 
demand answers, mobilize others, and force further justifications is a key example of 
institutional accountability at play. And although ITUC does go to lengths to secure loyalty, in 
this instance it was not sufficient to stem the initiation of quite public contestation. 
 
Loyalty 
 
Finally, actors can opt to remain loyal in light of justifications; this helps provide capital, 
resources, and support for the justifier. As noted previously, in line with Hirschman’s (1970, p. 
93) theory, accountability holders can seek to secure loyalty as a way to postpone exit and 
encourage voice. Several of the constituencies – such as BINGO and the Women and Gender 
Constituency (WGC) – display high degrees of loyalty from member organizations that 
contribute to positively sanctioning the focal points and other leaders of the constituency.25 We 
draw cursory examples from both constituencies in this section. Although loyalty moderates the 
usage and effects of exit and voice, we identify loyalty in practice through the absence of either 
positive/negative voice or exit despite instances of disagreement. 
 Along with ENGO, BINGO is the longest-standing and most active constituency. Its 
diverse membership ranges from green pro-regulatory coalitions of companies to anti-regulatory 
and even climate-skeptical members. As documented by researchers (Vormedal, 2008; Yamin & 
Depledge, 2004, pp. 52-54), the BINGO constituency has from its inception been divided 
between “gray” anti-mitigation fossil-fuel companies and “green” pro-regulation companies. In 
the words of an interviewee, the World Business Council of Sustainable Development (WBCSD) 
                                                          
24 Author observation from COP21 in Paris. December 10, 2015. 
25  RINGO is also largely built on loyalty as the constituency has a policy not to engage in advocacy. Rather 
members are expected to remain loyal to the constituency-wide position.  
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represents the big fossil side industry, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) the centrist 
position, while the European Business Council of Sustainable Energy represents the green end 
(S. Gallehr, Interview, 2015). 
 However, despite deep internal rifts, the BINGO constituency puts great efforts into 
generating loyalty: presenting themselves as a single unified constituency to provide a coherent 
business perspective on climate change (Yamin & Depledge, 2004; J. Drexhage, Interview, 
2015; M. Mendiluce, Interview 2015). In doing so, BINGO maintains closed-door meetings and 
private events. While it is clear that BINGO is divided between ‘green’ and ‘brown’ carbon 
emission reduction efforts, these views are rarely aired in public. Several interviewees from 
BINGO stressed to us “the ability of their organization to work out issues internally without 
wider consultation” (B. Black, Interview, 2013). Unlike ENGOs and other constituencies, 
however, BINGOs do not engage in policy advocacy in the UNFCCC. As one interviewee put it 
– by way of contrast to internal battles within ENGO – while BINGO members differ in 
positions when lobbying governments, when coming to COP they put their differences aside and 
unite around a business perspective on climate change. BINGO manages to speak with a single 
voice by: presenting general policy options; demanding regulatory certainty; seeking market-
based mechanisms; and striving toward less bureaucracy, better regulatory design, and a 
business-friendly environment (Yamin & Depledge, 2004, p. 53; J. Drexhage, Interview, 2015). 
 It is possible sometimes to see the emergence of splits between BINGOs at the COP 
when actors use rules, norms, and procedures to demand justifications from others. For instance, 
the ICC, who assigns the focal point for BINGOs, has ExxonMobile as a strong and influential 
member known for the most aggressive anti-climate stance among all oil companies. This 
prevented ICC from adopting a stronger pro-regulatory climate stance (Vormedal, 2008, p. 40). 
Likewise, when greener members of BINGO requested to make separate interventions in the 
negotiations, the ICC introduced an annex in 2003 to accommodate this request. This annex 
made it possible to make more far-reaching statements on the role of industry in promoting the 
transition to renewables (S. Gallehr, Interview, 2015). But overall, despite disagreement in terms 
of substantive issues, we observe strong loyalty toward  BINGO as a whole (M. Mendiluci, 
Interview, 2015; S. Gallehr, Interview, 2015; J. Drexhage, Interview, 2015). Differences are 
manifest when individual BINGO members make use of formal and informal networks to lobby 
individual governments and delegations be it for renewable energy, fossil fuels, nuclear, or 
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Carbon Capture and Storage. But within the UNFCCC, BINGO relies upon (and even privileges) 
loyalty to generate coherence for the business perspective. 
 Another example of loyalty comes from the WGC, which is one of the smallest of 
UNFCCC constituencies (comprising of around 15 civil society organizations) with the overall 
aim to promote a gender and human rights perspective in the UN climate negotiations (Olson, 
2014). Despite its strong activist history rooted in feminist movements in the South, WGC is as 
today dominated by loyalty from its membership organizations. After 20 years of activism in UN 
negotiations through networks such as Women in Environment and Development (WED), WGC 
was formalized as a UNFCCC constituency in 2009.26 
 The constituency stresses the importance of accountability mechanism to discourage exit 
and negative voice, but also to secure support behind joint positions in the climate 
negotiations (G. Alber, Interview, 2013: K. Cahoon, Interview, 2015; U. Nair, Interview, 2014, 
2015). In doing so, the WGC has two elected focal points – one from the North and one from the 
South to secure that the diversity of women’s voices is included. Furthermore, different thematic 
working groups have been established such as on Mitigation, Loss & Damage, and Finance and 
Technology Transfer as way to secure accountability (K. Cahoon, Interview, 2015). The daily 
morning Women Caucus meeting at COPs (open also to non-constituency members) is a venue 
to resolve differences and build consensus. When differences in opinions occur, the WGC take 
great effort to deliberate internally and resolve conflicts (U. Nair, Interview, 2015). 
 As a constituency with a long history of being based in social and grassroots movements, 
the WGC is an outlier compared to BINGO and LGMA, which have appointed focal points 
outside UNFCCC process through (respectively) the ICC and ICLEI. At COP20 in Lima, WGC 
decided to move into strategic policy advice as “gender mainstreaming” has been adopted as an 
official strategy by the UNFCCC (K. Cahoon, Interview, 2015; Olson, 2014). Consequently, in 
Paris, WGC started having closed meetings for constituency members only, which is a response 
to the need to speak with a coherent voice when approaching governments and UNFCCC.  The 
main task of WGC has recently shifted to provide expertise and influence governments and the 
UNFCCC to secure gender equality in policies on climate mitigation and adaptation, while 
outsider tactics of protests and demonstrators have taken a more secondary role (U. Nair, 
                                                          
26 WGC website: http://womengenderclimate.org, accessed December 27, 2015. 
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Interview, 2015). Hence, the constituency has developed internal accountability mechanisms to 
secure support for its policy positions. In other words, although this constituency has many rules, 
norms, and procedures to demand justifications from one-another, steps – such as closing the 
constituency meetings – are being taken to ensure that loyalty – at least in public terms – is the 
mechanism adopted by most constituency members. 
 Overall, BINGO and WGC put a premium on loyalty. Although actors often demand 
justifications from other constituency members and the focal point, this is done behind closed 
doors. This enables actors to voice grievances privately while continuing to stay loyal to the 
constituency publicly. This public loyalty acts as a positive form of sanctioning by increasing 
perceptions of unity, rewarding constituency leaders with de facto support, and mitigating the 
need for leaders to spend additional time and resources on quashing dissent. Efforts to deal with 
constituency-wide heterogeneity behind closed doors then leads to increased loyalty from 
constituency members (accountability holders), which in turn increases the likelihood of 
continued voice over exit.  As such loyalty is an important element of institutional 
accountability. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In conclusion we summarize our key findings and highlight future avenues for research. This 
paper has developed and empirically applied the concept of institutional accountability and 
juxtaposed it against delegation, participation, and networked modes of accountability. We argue 
that institutional accountability arises when actors, sharing the same institutional framework, use 
rules, norms and procedures to demand justification from one-another. In light of those 
justifications, accountability wielders then combine mechanisms of exit, voice, and loyalty to 
sanction – reward or punish – the accountability holder. 
 In order to show how institutional accountability works in practice we conducted an 
illustrative case study of accountability struggles between non-state actors within the UNFCCC. 
We depicted the general structure of the UNFCCC constituency system with a diversity of 
observer organizations – NGOs, industry groups, local government groups, indigenous and 
women movements – grappling for space, recognition, and influence in the wider system. Under 
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this institutional framework non-state actors routinely demand justifications from one another at 
daily meetings, in working groups, in liaison with the Secretariat, in official plenary sessions, in 
discussions with the focal point, and so on. Actors can then use exit, voice, and loyalty as 
mechanisms for sanctioning these justifications. We provided examples from a raft of observer 
organizations and constituency groups. This helps unpack how rules, procedures, and norms 
(structural features) combine with informal mechanisms to produce accountability of non-state 
actors in UN climate diplomacy (agentic choices). It enables us to look at how power struggles 
for accountability play out between non-state actors themselves in ways that shape the strategy 
and position of different constituency groups. Although it might be argued that our analysis 
simply captures power struggles between actors, our empirical material traces the necessary 
conditions of accountability – demanding justification and leveraging sanctions in light of those 
justifications – we have focused specifically on the politics of institutional accountability. 
Indeed, we argue it would be a mistake not to view certain power struggles through the lens of 
accountability. 
 Finally, this recognition of institutional accountability generates several future avenues of 
research and we focus here on two in particular. On one hand, other scholars should seek to 
determine the scope of institutional accountability. Does it apply only to non-state actors, or do 
states also engage in mechanisms of exit, voice, and loyalty within institutional frameworks to 
demand accountability? Moreover scholars should analyze whether institutional accountability 
arises in other areas such as the UN High-Level Political Forum negotiating the sustainable 
development goals and the post-2015 development agenda. Given the enormous range of 
institutions that compose governance beyond the state, this form of accountability may offer 
insight into the politics of accountability within those structures. On the other hand, scholars 
should also seek to determine the conditions under which institutional accountability actually 
occurs and when exit, voice, and loyalty is successful in practice. When do actors choose to 
engage exit, voice, or loyalty? Which is more successful in changing the accountability holder’s 
behavior in the future? As non-state actors continue to exercise influence and authority, 
understanding how institutional accountability constrains and empowers these actors is critical as 
we seek to map and assess the legitimacy and effectiveness of climate governance. 
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Table 1 
 
Type of 
Accountability 
Accountability 
holder 
Accountability 
wielder 
Accountability 
standards 
Accountability 
mechanisms 
Internal 
accountability 
Agent in a 
principal-agent 
relationship 
Principal in a 
principal-agent 
relationship 
Standards and 
goals agreed 
between principal 
and agent 
Sanctions 
agreed 
between 
principal and 
agent 
External 
accountability 
Agent exercising 
power over 
others 
Agents affected 
by the exercise of 
power 
Standards of 
responsiveness 
Mechanisms 
to ensure 
responsiveness 
(voting, 
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deliberation, 
etc.) 
Networked 
accountability 
Agents in a 
network 
Other agents in 
the same network 
Standards arise 
within the 
network 
Peer, market, 
and 
reputational 
concerns 
Institutional 
accountability 
Agents within a 
formal 
institutional 
space 
Other agents 
sharing that 
institutional space 
Standards arise 
within the 
institutional space 
Exit, voice, 
and loyalty 
 
 
